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11 Introduction
In the neoclassical theory of the ﬁrm, the notion of inputs is deﬁned only after classes of
goods are speciﬁed. Inputs are substitutes if when the price of one type of input rises,
the number of units demanded of the other types cannot fall. But what are “types”
of inputs? If electricity generated at locations A and B are perfectly substitutable in
production, should we regard these as one class of input or two? The answer would seem
to depend on whether the inputs can have diﬀerent prices. To investigate the distinction,
we will say that the ﬁrm has a weak-substitute valuation when the substitutes condition
is satisﬁed for distinct types of goods and a strong-substitute valuation when, in addition,
it is satisﬁed even for individual goods of the same type. The biggest surprises in our
analysis are that even in very ordinary-looking problems, the two notions of substitution
have very diﬀerent implications, even for the study of linear pricing equilibria.
We illustrate the distinction with simple examples. Suppose that the price of output is
one and that the amount of output produced by a ﬁrm f(x,y) is a function of two types
of discrete inputs x ∈ {0,1} and y ∈ {0,1,2}, as follows:
f y = 0 y = 1 y = 2
x = 0 0 1
√
2
x = 1 1 1
√
2
f is submodular in its two arguments and has nonincreasing marginal returns.1 The ﬁrm
chooses x and y to maximize f(x,y)−rx−wy. Since f is submodular, the inputs x and
y are substitutes.2 Substitutes means that when comparing any two price vectors p and
p0 for which the ﬁrm’s optimum is unique, if p ≥ p0 and pi = p0
i, then the demand for good
i is weakly higher at prices p.
Next, consider a formulation in which the two units of input y are treated as distinct.
1It is easy to see that functionally identical inputs can fail to be substitutes for one another in the
usual sense of price theory when there are increasing marginal returns to that type of input. In order to
be clear that this is not what underlies our example, we chose f with nonincreasing marginal returns.
2Submodularity guarantees the substitutes property when the economy has two goods.
2Let y = y1 + y2 and suppose y1,y2 ∈ {0,1}. In this formulation, the prices are also
potentially distinct, so the ﬁrm maximizes f(x,y1 + y2) − rx − w1y1 − w2y2. It is as
if we had distinguished blue and red versions of the input, where the color is devoid
of any consequences for production. It is easy to check that if the input prices are
(r,w1,w2) = (0.2,0.3,0.2), then the ﬁrm’s unique proﬁt-maximizing input vector is (0,1,1),
but if (r,w1,w2) = (0.2,0.3,0.7), then the proﬁt-maximizing choice is (1,0,0). This demon-
strates that an increase in the price of input y2 reduces the demand for input y1: diﬀerent
units of the same type of good may fail to be substitutes.
Examples of this sort are hardly rare. For instance, an airline that is acquiring landing
slots at a hub airport may wish to have some number N of slots, for illustration N=2,
within a particular period, say from 2:00pm to 2:15pm or from 3:00pm to 3:15pm. The
two periods deﬁne weak substitutes if when slots at 2-2:15 are expensive, the airline
will substitute slots at 3-3:15. Slots within a given time period, however, need not be
substitutes. As in our example, the airline may demand both or neither and this can
happen even with diminishing returns to additional slots in the same time period. Because
clock auctions have been proposed for just this sort of application, it is important to
investigate how these auctions perform in settings where slots are weak substitutes but
not strong substitutes.
Despite the practical signiﬁcance of the weak substitutes condition, it has not been ana-
lyzed in previous studies of ascending clock auctions, which have instead emphasized the
strong substitutes case. Ausubel (2006, p. 16) mentions that his clock auction design,
which applies when goods are distinct and substitutes, can also be applied when there
are multiple units of each good. As our examples show, however, that extension entails a
stronger condition than weak substitutes and even than weak substitutes plus diminishing
marginal returns to each good. Gul and Stacchetti (2000) restrict their auction design to
nonidentical goods, in eﬀect assuming strong substitutes.
One important diﬀerence between the weak and strong substitutes arises when studying
the existence of market-clearing prices. Using models in which goods are priced indi-
vidually, Kelso and Crawford (1982) establish that when distinct goods are substitutes,
market-clearing prices always exist. Gul and Stacchetti (2000) and Milgrom (2000) dis-
play monotonic auction processes that converge to exact or approximate market-clearing
prices.3 In all of those formulations, substitutes means strong substitutes: the results do
3The Gul-Stacchetti analysis assumes that bidder values are integers and their algorithm requires that
bidders report their entire demand set at each point. When interpreted as an auction, the requirement
3not extend to the case of weak substitutes. For suppose in our example that good y is
treated as a single class and that the available supply for the two classes of goods is given
by the vector (1,2). Suppose that ﬁrm 1 has valuation f as before, and that there is a
second ﬁrm with unit valuation g(x,y) = 1y≥1 (thus, ﬁrm 2 is only interested in getting
one unit of good y). At the eﬃcient allocation, ﬁrm 2 uses one unit of y and ﬁrm 1 uses
one unit of x. To induce ﬁrm 1 to make this choice, the price of input y must be strictly
positive, but then ﬁrm 1 will strictly prefer not to buy any units of input y and ﬁrm 2
will strictly prefer to buy exactly one unit. Hence, there will be a strict excess supply
of y: no market clearing prices exist.
In our example, if the supply vector is anything else besides (1,2), then not only does a
market clearing price vector exist, but more is true. First, the set of market clearing price
vectors is a sublattice. Second, a continuous tˆ atonnement or clock auction process be-
ginning with low prices converges monotonically upward to the minimum market clearing
price vector. A similar process beginning with high prices converges monotonically down-
ward to the maximum market clearing price vector. Similar conclusions have been derived
in the past using strong substitutes, but not for the weak substitutes of this example.
How does the clock auction perform when there are no market clearing prices? Suppose
that ﬁrm 1 has valuation f as above, ﬁrm 2 has valuation v(x,y) = .05 × 1y≥1, supply is
(1,1) and we initially set the input price vector to (0,0). At that price there is strict excess
demand for good y but not for good x. The price of good y is gradually increased. When
py becomes greater than .05, ﬁrm 2’s demand drops to 0 units of good y. Eventually, the
price reaches a level ¯ py at which ﬁrm 1 is indiﬀerent between buying one unit of x or two
units of y, as determined by the equation 1 =
√
2−2¯ py. At that price, ﬁrm 1 is indiﬀerent
between 1 unit of x or two units of y, while ﬁrm 2 is indiﬀerent between 0 and 1 unit of
good x (since px = 0). Aggregate demand thus consists of the bundles (2,1), (2,0), (0,1)
and (0,2), hence contains supply (1,1) in its convex hull. We deﬁne such a situation as
a pseudo-equilibrium.4 In this example, there is no Walrasian equilibrium and the clock
auction terminates at the minimum pseudo-equilibrium price vector.
Examples of this sort are potentially signiﬁcant for the design of activity rules in auctions.
At prices (px,p1,p2) = (.4,.4,.41), ﬁrm 1 demands (x,y1,y2) = (0,1,1) while at prices
that demand sets be reported makes their procedure diﬀerent from any auction process in current use.
In contrast, the clock auctions we analyze allow bidders to report a single demand vector for every price
vector.
4Precisely, this property is equivalent to our deﬁnition of pseudo-equilibrium. See Deﬁnition 11.
4(px,p1,p2) = (.4,.5,.41), ﬁrm 1 demands (x,y1,y2) = (1,0,0). Suppose these two price
vectors represent successive prices in an ascending auction and that the next price vector
is (.5,.5,.41). The ﬁrm’s demand now shifts to (0,1,1): its total demand rises from 1 unit
to 2 units. Hatﬁeld and Milgrom (2005) had shown that the strong substitutes property
implies that a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm satisﬁes the law of aggregate demand: as prices
rise, the sum of the quantities of goods demanded does not increase. Activity rules for
ascending auctions with or without clocks typically require that the demand expressed
during an auction must satisfy that law,5 and our example shows that such rules can block
straightforward bidding when goods are weak substitutes (but not when they are strong
substitutes).
These observations herald more general results, which are the subject of this paper. Sec-
tion 2 deﬁnes weak-substitute valuations, based on a multi-unit formulation of the econ-
omy, and strong-substitute valuations, based on a binary formulation. Section 3 charac-
terizes weak-substitute and strong-substitute valuations in terms of the ﬁrm’s dual proﬁt
function, which adds transparency to some of our central results. Section 4 further stud-
ies the concepts of substitutes and how they are related. Gul and Stacchetti had shown
that strong substitutes is equivalent to a certain single-improvement property deﬁned us-
ing nonlinear prices. We show that it is also equivalent to a similar property deﬁned
using only linear prices that strong substitutes is equivalent to weak substitutes plus two
additional conditions, and that while the law of aggregate demand may fail with weak
substitutes, it always holds when a certain additional assumption is made, which we call
the consecutive-integer property. This property means that if bundles x and y are both
optimal at some given price and xk < yk for some good k, then there are also optimal
bundles requiring a quantity zk of good k, for zk ∈ {xk,xk + 1,...yk}. Section 5 treats
the implications of weak and strong substitutes for aggregate demand. We show that
the strong substitutes condition is suﬃcient and necessary (in a quantiﬁed sense) for the
robust existence of market-clearing prices, that the weak substitutes condition implies
that the set of pseudo-equilibrium price vectors is a non-empty sublattice, that this set
coincides with the set of equilibrium prices whenever an equilibrium exists, and that the
strong-substitutes is a suﬃcient and, in a similar quantiﬁed sense, necessary condition
for Vickrey payoﬀs to be in the core. Section 6 presents our analysis of clock auctions
when bidders have weak-substitute valuations. We ﬁrst introduce a continuous model to
represent clock auctions. We show that weak substitutes is necessary and suﬃcient for the
monotonicity of a certain tˆ atonnement-like clock auction and that continuous descending
5An exception is the revealed-preference activity rule of Ausubel and Milgrom (2002).
5or ascending clock auctions always terminate at a pseudo-equilibrium. In one version of
the clock auction model, the auction terminates at the smallest pseudo-equilibrium price.
We then show how the analysis can be applied to the case in which prices follow small
bid increments bidders only need to announce one optimal bundle, rather than their en-
tire indiﬀerence set of optimal bundles. Section 7 concludes and compares our results to
the very diﬀerent results of the divisible goods case obtained by Milgrom and Strulovici
(2006).
2 Deﬁnitions
Consider an economy with K goods, in which good k is available in Nk units for k ∈ K =
{1,...,K}. Let X = Πk∈K{0,1,...,Nk} and ˜ X = Πk∈K{0,1}Nk represent the space of
possible bundles of the exchange economy in its multi-unit and binary formulations. The
obvious correspondence between these formulations is represented by the function φ : ˜ X
into X. Formally, xk = ϕk(˜ x) =
PNk
j=1 ˜ xkj.
Definition 1 (Multi-Unit Valuation) A multi-unit valuation v is a mapping from
X into R.
Definition 2 (Binary Valuation) A binary valuation ˜ v is a mapping from ˜ X into R.
The binary valuation ˜ v corresponds to the multi-unit valuation v, if for every ˜ x, ˜ v(˜ x) =
v(ϕ(˜ x)). We denote by V the space of multi-unit valuations and ˜ V the space of correspond-
ing binary valuations. Similarly, P = RK
+ and ˜ P = Πk∈KR
Nk
+ denote the respective price
spaces of the multi-unit and binary economies. The ﬁrst formulation permits only linear
prices for each category of goods, while the second eﬀectively allows nonlinear prices for
each class of goods, with the marginal price for each good weakly increasing. Throughout
the paper, we assume that agents have quasi-linear utilities.
Assumption 1 (Quasi-linearity) The utility of an agent with multi-unit valuation v
acquiring a bundle x at price p is u(x,p) = v(x) − px. Similarly, the utility of an agent
with binary valuation ˜ v acquiring a bundle ˜ x at price ˜ p is ˜ u(˜ x, ˜ p) = ˜ v(˜ x) − ˜ p˜ x.
Given a binary valuation ˜ v and a price vector ˜ p ∈ ˜ P, deﬁne the demand of the agent at
price ˜ p by ˜ D(˜ p) = argmax˜ x∈ ˜ X{˜ v(˜ x) − ˜ p˜ x}.
6Similarly, we deﬁne the multi-unit demand D of an agent with valuation v as D(p) =
argmaxx∈X{v(x) − px}.
With quasi-linear preferences, there is no distinction to be made between gross and net
substitutes, so we drop the modiﬁer and make the following deﬁnitions.
Definition 3 (Strong-Substitute Valuation) A multi-unit valuation v is a strong-
substitute valuation if its binary form ˜ v satisﬁes the binary substitutes property: for any
prices ˜ p and ˜ q in ˜ P such that ˜ p ≤ ˜ q, and x ∈ ˜ D(˜ p), there exists a bundle ˜ x0 ∈ ˜ D(˜ q) such
that ˜ x0
kj ≥ ˜ xkj for all (k,j) such that ˜ pkj = ˜ qkj.
Definition 4 (Weak-Substitute Valuation) A multi-unit valuation v is a weak-
substitute valuation if it satisﬁes the multi-unit substitutes property: for all prices p
and q such that p ≤ q and x ∈ D(p), there exists a bundle x0 ∈ D(q) such that x0
k ≥ xk
for all k in K = {κ ∈ K : pκ = qκ}.
The strong substitutes condition is at least weakly more restrictive than the weak substi-
tutes condition, because the latter applies only for linear prices while the former applies
also for nonlinear prices. Moreover, the weak substitutes condition only compares units
of distinct goods, while the strong substitutes condition requires that units of the same
good be substitutes. Section 1 illustrates that the two conditions are not equivalent. In
particular, weak-substitute valuations can violate the law of aggregate demand, but strong
substitute valuations cannot.
3 Duality Results
To any multi-unit valuation v we associate the dual proﬁt function π : P → R such that
π(p) = maxx∈X{u(x,p) = v(x) − px}. Similarly, to any binary valuation ˜ v we associate
the dual proﬁt function ˜ π(˜ p) = max˜ x∈ ˜ X{˜ u(˜ x, ˜ p) = ˜ v(˜ x) − ˜ p˜ x}.
Definition 5 (Multi-Unit Concavity) A multi-unit valuation is concave if it can be
extended to a concave function on RK.
Theorem 1 Let v be a multi-unit valuation and π be its dual proﬁt function. Then, for
all x ∈ X, v(x) ≤ minp∈P{π(p) + px}. Moreover, v is concave if and only if
v(x) = min
p∈P
{π(p) + px} for all x ∈ X. (1)
7Proof. The ﬁrst claim follows from the deﬁnition of π. The second claim is proved by
applying the separating-hyperplane theorem. 
Ausubel’s and Milgrom’s dual characterization of strong substitute valuations extends
straightforwardly to the cases treated here.
Theorem 2 (Ausubel and Milgrom (2002)) v is a weak-substitute valuation if and
only if π is submodular, and this holds if and only if the dual proﬁt function ˜ π of the
corresponding binary form ˜ v = φ(v) is submodular on the restricted domain where goods
of the same type have equal prices. In addition, v is a strong-substitute valuation if and
only if the dual proﬁt function ˜ π of its binary form ˜ v = φ(v) is submodular.
Proof. The proofs of the two statements follow the proof of Theorem 10 in Ausubel and
Milgrom (2002). 
The preceding theorem relies on the idea that one can characterize weak substitutes by
focusing on the subset PL of the price space in the binary formulation ˜ P in which goods of
the same type have the same price. This subset is isomorphic to the set P of linear prices
used in the multi-unit economy. The weak-substitute property then corresponds to the
requirement that the dual proﬁt function is submodular on PL, while the strong-substitute
property requires submodularity on the whole price space. An immediate consequence of
this alternative formulation is the following:
Theorem 3 Any strong-substitute valuation is also a weak-substitute valuation.
The converse is not true. For example, suppose there is only one type of good, so that
every valuation v is a weak-substitute valuation. Let v(0) = 0, v(1) = 1 and v(2) = 3
and suppose prices are (p1,p2) = (1.4,1.4), at which both units are demanded. Increasing
p1 to 1.7 would reduce demand to 0, thus violating the strong-substitute property. The
same example establishes that a multi-unit valuation can be submodular even when the
related binary valuation is not.
We have seen than weak-substitute valuations need not be submodular. The following
result shows that adding the requirement that v is concave does yield submodularity.
Theorem 4 Any concave weak-substitute valuation is submodular.
8Proof. From Theorem 1 v(x) = minp∈P{π(p) + px} = maxp{−π(p) − px}. From
Theorem 2, π is submodular. Therefore, v is the maximum over p of a function that is
supermodular in p and −x, which implies that v is supermodular in −x or, equivalently,
submodular in x. 
Theorem 5 Let ˜ v be a strong-substitute valuation. Then ˜ v(˜ x) = min˜ p∈ ˜ P{˜ π(˜ p) + ˜ p˜ x}.
Proof. Given ˜ x, deﬁne ˜ p as ˜ pa = 0 if ˜ xa = 1 and ˜ pa = ∞ if ˜ xa = 0. Clearly, ˜ x ∈ ˜ D(˜ p).
The rest of the proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 1. 
Underlying Theorem 4 is the fact that concavity allows v to be expressed by formula (1).
As Theorem 5 shows, concavity is not required in the binary form to obtain that equation,
which oﬀers a way to understand why strong substitutes implies submodularity.
4 Relations between Concepts of Substitutes
Gul and Stacchetti (1999) introduced the single-improvement property for binary valua-
tions, which requires that if some vector x is not demanded at price vector p, then there
is a vector y that is strictly preferred to x and entails increasing the demand for at most
one good and decreasing the demand for at most one other good, as follows.
Definition 6 (Binary Single-Improvement Property) A binary valuation ˜ v sat-
isﬁes the single-improvement property if for any price vector ˜ p and ˜ x / ∈ ˜ D(˜ p), there exists
˜ y such that u(˜ y, ˜ p) > u(˜ x, ˜ p), k(˜ y − ˜ x)+k1 ≤ 1, and k(˜ x − ˜ y)+k1 ≤ 1.
Gul and Stacchetti also showed that this single-improvement property is equivalent to the
strong substitutes property:
Theorem 6 (Gul and Stacchetti (1999)) A monotonic valuation is a strong-substitute
valuation if and only if it satisﬁes the binary single-improvement property.
We now extend these results to multi-unit economies.
Definition 7 (Multi-Unit Single-Improvement Property) A valuation v satis-
ﬁes the multi-unit single-improvement property if for any p and x / ∈ D(p), there exists x0
such that u(x0,p) > u(x,p), k(x0 − x)+k1 ≤ 1, and6 k(x − x0)+k1 ≤ 1.
6Here the norm is deﬁned on RK, whereas it was deﬁned on R
P
k Nk in the binary setting.
9The only diﬀerence in the deﬁnitions of binary and multi-unit single-improvement prop-
erties resides in the price domain where the property has to hold.
Throughout the paper, we will denote by ek the vector of RK whose kth component equals
one and whose other components equal zero.
Theorem 7 If v satisﬁes the multi-unit single-improvement property then it is a weak-
substitute valuation.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that the weak-substitute property is violated: there
exist p, k, a small positive constant ε, and a bundle x such that x ∈ D(p) and for all
y ∈ D(p + εek), there exists j 6= k such that yj < xj. Set ˆ p = p + εek. We have
x / ∈ D(ˆ p) and yk < xk for all y ∈ D(ˆ p) (since D(p) clearly contains bundles with strictly
less than xk units of good k). Therefore x is only dominated by bundles y that have
strictly less units of at least two goods, implying that k(x−y)+k1 ≥ 2, which violates the
single-improvement property. 
The converse in not true. In the ﬁrst example of Section 1, the valuation is submodular
in a two-good economy, thus satisﬁes the weak substitutes property. However, for r = 0.2
and w = 0.3, the bundle (1,0) is only dominated by the bundle (0,2), which violates the
single-improvement property.
Definition 8 (Multi-Unit Submodularity) A multi-unit valuation v is submodular
if for any vectors x and x0 of X, v(x) + v(x0) ≥ v(x ∧ x0) + v(x ∨ x0).
The next theorem contains a key result for the existence of Walrasian equilibria in multi-
unit economies. The proof uses Gul and Stacchetti’s characterization theorem (Theo-
rem 6) and thus requires monotonicity of v. Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume
that v is nondecreasing.
Assumption 2 Agent valuations are nondecreasing.
Theorem 8 If v is a strong-substitute valuation, then any bundle x is optimal at some
linear price.
Proof.
10Let x be any bundle, and ˜ x be a binary representation of this bundle. From Theorem 5,
we have
v(x) = ˜ v(˜ x) = min
˜ p
{˜ π(˜ p) + ˜ p˜ x}. (2)
Since v is a strong substitutes valuation, ˜ π is submodular, so the objective in (2) is
submodular. By a theorem of Topkis (1998), the set M of minimizers of a submodular
function is a sublattice and, since the objective is continuous, the sublattice is closed.
Therefore, it has a largest element ˜ p. We claim that this element is a linear price which
supports ˜ x. Linearity means that for any good k such that xk ≥ 1, ˜ pki = ˜ pkj whenever
˜ xki = ˜ xkj = 1.
Suppose by contradiction that ˜ pki 6= ˜ pkj for some units i, j of some good k such that
˜ xki = ˜ xkj = 1. Then the price vector ˜ p0 equal to ˜ p except for units i and j of good k,
where ˜ pki and ˜ pkj are swapped, is also a minimizer of (2). Therefore ˜ p∨˜ p0 > ˜ p is also in M,
which contradicts maximality of ˜ p. We have thus shown that ˜ p is linear on the support
of ˜ x: for each good k there exists a price pk such that ˜ pki = pk for all i such that ˜ xki = 1.
Obviously, ˜ pkl = +∞ whenever ˜ xkl = 0. For any good k such that xk ∈ {1,Nk − 1}, the
ﬁrm is indiﬀerent, at ˜ p, between x and some bundle yk such that yk
k < xk, otherwise it
would be possible to increase pk, which would contradict maximality of ˜ p. We can choose
yk so that it is optimal if we slightly increase the price of some particular unit of good k.
Since ˜ v is a strong substitute valuation, we can choose y such that yk
k = xk − 1, and
yk
j ≥ xj for all j. Since ˜ pkl = +∞ outside of the support of ˜ x, we necessarily have yk
j = xj
for j 6= k. This shows that yk = x − ek. Such indiﬀerence bundles exist for all goods k
such that 1 ≤ xk ≤ Nk − 1.
We now prove that x is optimal for the linear price vector p = (pk)k∈K, where pk = +∞
when xk = 0, pk = 0 when xk = Nk, and pk is deﬁned as above when 1 ≤ xk ≤ Nk−1. That
is, we can impose ˜ pkl = pk for all units, including those for which ˜ xkl = 0, and preserve
optimality of x. For all goods such that xk ∈ [1,Nk − 1], reset all unit prices outside the
support of ˜ x from +∞ to pk. This change does not aﬀect optimality of x among bundles z
such that z ≤ x, and it does not aﬀect indiﬀerence between x and the bundles yk. For any
good k, consider the bundle zk = x+ek. Since ˜ v is submodular, Theorem 11 implies that
v is component-wise concave (see p. 14). Therefore, v(zk) − v(x) ≤ v(x) − v(yk) = pk,
which implies that zk is weakly dominated by x. Now for two goods k 6= j such that
xk ≥ 1 and xj < Nj, consider the bundle zkj = x − ek + ej. We claim that z is also
weakly dominated by x. To see this, we use the following Lemma, whose proof is in the
11Appendix.7
Lemma 1 If v is a strong-substitute valuation, k and j are two goods and x is a bundle
such that xk ≤ Nk−1 and xj ≤ Nj−2, then v(x+ek+ej)−v(x+ek) ≥ v(x+2ej)−v(x+ej).
Applying Lemma 1 to the bundle x − ej − ek yields v(x) − v(yj) ≥ v(zkj) − v(yk), which
implies, along with v(x) = v(yj) + pj = v(yk) + pk, that v(x) − pk ≥ v(zkj) − pj. Thus,
x weakly dominates z. This shows that ˜ x has no single improvement. From Theorem 6,
˜ v satisﬁes the single-improvement property. Therefore, ˜ x must be optimal at the linear
price ˜ p such that ˜ pkl = pk for all l ∈ {1,...,Nk}. Equivalently, the bundle x is optimal
at price p = (pk), which concludes the proof. 
We can now state the properties of strong-substitute valuations in linear-pricing economies.
Theorem 9 Suppose that v is a strong-substitute valuation. Then it satisﬁes the follow-
ing properties:
[Concavity] v is concave.
[Weak-Substitute Property.] For any p ∈ P, k ∈ K, ε > 0, and x ∈ D(p), there exists
x0 ∈ D(p + εek) such that x0
j ≥ xj for all j 6= k.
[Law of Aggregate Demand.] For any p ∈ P, k ∈ K, ε > 0, and x ∈ D(p), there exists
x0 ∈ D(p + εek) such that kx0k1 ≤ kxk1.
[Consecutive-Integer Property.] For any p ∈ P and k ∈ K, the set Dk(p) = {zk : z ∈
D(p)} consists of consecutive integers.
Proof. Theorem 3 implies that v satisﬁes the weak-substitute property, and Hatﬁeld
and Milgrom (2005) show that v must satisfy the law of aggregate demand. Therefore, it
remains to show that v is concave and satisﬁes the consecutive-integer property.
We ﬁrst show that v is concave. Theorem 8 implies that for any x there exists p such that
π(p) = v(x) − px, where π is the dual proﬁt function deﬁned in Section 3. From the ﬁrst
part of Theorem 1, v(x) ≤ minp π(p) + px. Combining the two equations above yields
v(x) = minp π(p)+px for all x. Applying the second part of Theorem 1 then proves that
v is concave.8
7As can be easily checked, the proof of Lemma 1 is independent of the proof of the present theorem.
8As can be easily veriﬁed, the proof of Theorem 1 is independent of the present proof.
12Last, we show the consecutive-integer property. Suppose by contradiction that there exist
p, k, and two bundles x and y in D(p) such that xk ≥ yk+2 and z ∈ D(p) ⇒ zk / ∈ (yk,xk).
Consider the binary price vector ˜ p that is linear and equal to pj for all good j 6= k, and
that equals pk for the ﬁrst xk units of good k and +∞ for the remaining units of good k.
Clearly, there exist binary forms ˜ x and ˜ y of x and y that belong to ˜ D(˜ p), and there is
no bundle ˜ z in ˜ D(˜ p) such that zk ∈ (yk,xk). If the price of one unit of good k is slightly
increased, the demand for good k thus falls directly below zk, implying that the demand
of another unit of good k, whose price had not increased, has strictly decreased, which
violates the strong-substitute property for ˜ v. 
The consecutive-integer property is not implied by concavity of v. For example, in a
(multi-unit) two-good economy, concavity is compatible with the demand set D(p) =
{(1,0),(0,2)}. However, this demand set violates the consecutive-integer property: the
set D2(p) = {0,2} does not consist of consecutive integers. The consecutive-integer
property rules out valuations causing a sudden decrease in the consumption of a good
(independently of the consumption of other goods). For example, there are no prices at
which the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between bundles containing, say, 5 and 10 units of a good,
but strictly prefers these bundles to any bundle containing between 6 and 9 units of that
good. In that sense, there are no “holes” in the demand set with respect to any good. In
terms of demand, the property implies a progressive reaction to price movements: as the
price of a good increases, the optimal demand of that good decreases unit by unit. By
contrast, concavity is not required for the law of aggregate demand.
Theorem 10 If v is a weak-substitute valuation that satisﬁes the consecutive-integer
property, then it satisﬁes the law of aggregate demand.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The weak-substitute property and the law of aggregate demand do not imply the consecutive-
integer property. For example, in an economy with one good available in two units,
consider the non-concave valuation v(0) = 0, v(1) = 1, and v(2) = 4. v is trivially a
substitutes valuation, and satisﬁes the law of aggregate demand. However, at price p = 2,
the demand set is {0,2}, which violates the consecutive-integer property. This is also an
example of a weak-substitute valuation that is not concave.
To obtain sharp results, we consider the concept of component-wise concavity, which
is weaker than concavity and entails diminishing marginal returns in each component
13separately.
Definition 9 (Component-wise Concavity) A multi-unit valuation v is component-
wise concave if for all x and k, v(xk + 1,x−k) − v(x) ≥ v(xk + 2,x−k) − v(xk + 1,x−k).
Theorem 11 A multi-unit valuation v is submodular and component-wise concave if and
only if its binary form ˜ v = φ(v) is submodular.
Proof. By a theorem of Topkis (1998), it is suﬃcient to consider binary bundles x and y
that diﬀer in just two components. If the two components represent the same good, then
submodularity of the binary form is the same as component-wise concavity. If the two
components represent diﬀerent goods, then submodularity of the binary form is implied
by submodularity of the multi-unit form (and conversely). 
The last three properties listed in Theorem 9 describe the demands corresponding to a
strong-substitute valuation in linear-pricing economies. Even though strong-substitute
valuations are deﬁned by their demands in response to nonlinear prices, the identiﬁed
properties turn out to be suﬃcient to characterize strong substitutes. That is the essential
content of Theorem 12 below.
Before proving this theorem, we state a new “minimax” result, in which one of the choice
set is a lattice and the other choice set consists of nonlinear prices. The proof of this
result is in the Appendix.
If x is a multi-unit bundle and ˜ p is a nonlinear price vector, let (˜ p,x) denote the cost of







where ˜ pk(i) is the price of the ith cheapest unit of good k.
Proposition 1 (Minimax) Suppose that v is a concave weak-substitute valuation sat-
isfying the consecutive-integer property, and let ˜ p be a nonlinear price vector. Then,
max
x min
p {π(p) + px − (˜ p,x)} = min
p max
x {π(p) + px − (˜ p,x)}
Theorem 12 Let v be a multi-unit valuation. The following properties are equivalent.
(i) v is a strong-substitute valuation.
14(ii) v is a concave weak-substitute valuation, and satisﬁes the consecutive-integer prop-
erty.
Proof. We know from Theorem 9 that (i) implies (ii). We now show that (ii) implies (i).
From Theorem 2, it is enough to show that ˜ π is submodular. Consider any nonlinear price
vector ˜ p. We have
˜ π(˜ p) = max
˜ x
{˜ v(˜ x) − ˜ p˜ x} = max
x {v(x) − (˜ p,x)}.
Since v is concave, Theorem 1 implies that
˜ π(˜ p) = max
x {min
p {π(p) + px} − (˜ p,x)} = max
x {min
p {π(p) + px − (˜ p,x)}}.
From Proposition 1, the max and min operators can be swapped:
˜ π(˜ p) = min
p {max
x {π(p) + px − (˜ p,x)}} = min
p {π(p) + max
x {px − (˜ p,x)}}.





(pk − ˜ pki)+.
Therefore,








(pk − ˜ pki)+
)
.
Since v is a weak-substitute valuation, π is submodular by Theorem 2. Moreover, the
function (x,y) → (x − y)+ is submodular as a convex function of the diﬀerence x − y.
Therefore, ˜ π(˜ p) is the minimum over p of an objective function that is submodular in p
and ˜ p, which shows that it is submodular in ˜ p.9 
It turns out that, given concavity and the weak-substitute property, the law of aggregate
demand is equivalent to the consecutive integer property. Some of the main results above
are combined and extended in the following theorem.
Theorem 13 (Equivalence of Substitute Concepts) Let v be a multi-unit valu-
ation. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) v satisﬁes the binary single-improvement property.
9See Topkis (1968).
15(ii) v is a strong-substitute valuation.
(iii) v is a concave weak-substitute valuation and satisﬁes the consecutive-integer prop-
erty.
(iv) v is a concave weak-substitute valuation and satisﬁes the law of aggregate demand.
(v) v is concave and satisﬁes the multi-unit single-improvement property.
Proof. (i) ⇔ (ii) is Gul and Stacchetti’s theorem (see Theorem 6). (ii) ⇔ (iii) is a
restatement of Theorem 12. Theorem 10 shows that (iii) implies (iv). For the converse,
the weak-substitute property implies10 for all p that any edge E of D(p) has direction ei or
ei−αej for some goods i,j. In the ﬁrst case, concavity implies that all integral bundles on
the edge belong to the demand. In the second case, α = 1. Otherwise, slightly modifying
the price would reduce demand to that edge, and increasing pi if α > 1 or pj if α < 1
would violate the law of aggregate demand. This, along with concavity, implies that the
consecutive-integer property holds along all edges, and thus for D(p). (i)−(iv) implies (v):
(i) clearly implies the multi-unit single-improvement property, and (iii) implies concavity.
We conclude by showing that (v) implies (iii). We already know from Theorem 7 that
if v satisﬁes (v), then it is a weak-substitute valuation. Therefore, there only remains to
show that v satisﬁes the consecutive-integer property. Suppose it doesn’t. There exists
a price vector p, a good k, and a unit number d such that Dk = {zk : z ∈ D(p)} is split
by d: the sets D
−
k = Dk ∩ [0,d − 1] and D
+
k = Dk ∩ [d + 1,Nk] are disjoint and cover
Dk. Now slightly increase pk. The new demand set D0 is such that D0
k ⊂ D
−
k . Pick any
bundle y that is optimal under the new price within the set {x ∈ X : xk ≥ d}. Then
yk > d, because pk has only been slightly increased and any bundle with d units of good
k was strictly dominated by D
+
k . At the new price, y is dominated but cannot be strictly
improved upon with reducing the amount of good k by at least two units, which violates
the single-improvement property. 
The multi-unit single-improvement property alone is not equivalent to strong substitutes.
For example, in an economy with two goods available in two units, consider the valuation
v deﬁned by v(x) = kxk1 − .1r(x), where r(x) equals 1 if x contains exactly one unit
of each good, and 0 otherwise. The valuation is not concave, and therefore cannot be a
strong-substitute valuation. However, one can easily verify that v satisﬁes the multi-unit
single-improvement property.
10See the proof of Proposition 1.
16We conclude this section with a property of concave, weak-substitute valuations. For any
(multi-unit) bundle x, let P(x) denote the set of price vectors such that x ∈ D(p).
Theorem 14 If v is a weak-substitute valuation, then for all x, P(x) is either the empty
set or the complete sublattice of P given by P(x) = argmin{π(p) + px}.
Proof. Fix x ∈ X. From Theorem 5, v(x) ≤ minp{π(p)+px}. Suppose that the inequality
is strict. Then v(x) − px < π(p) for all p, so P(x) is the empty set. Now suppose that
v(x) = minp{π(p) + px}. Then, for all p ∈ argmin{π(p) + px}, v(x) − px = π(p), so
x ∈ D(p). Conversely, if x ∈ D(¯ p) for some price ¯ p, then argmin{π(p) + px} = v(x) =
π(¯ p)+ ¯ px. Therefore, P(x) = argmin{π(p)+px}. From Theorem 2, π(p) is submodular.
Therefore P(x) is the set of minimizers of a submodular function over a sublattice P;
hence, it is a sublattice of P. Completeness is obtained by a standard limit argument. 
In the binary formulation, all bundles can be achieved through nonlinear pricing, by
setting some unit prices to zero and others to inﬁnity. Therefore, Theorem 14 takes a
simpler form. For any binary bundle ˜ x, let ˜ P(˜ x) denote the set of price vectors such that
˜ x ∈ ˜ D(˜ p).
Theorem 15 If ˜ v is a binary valuation satisfying the strong substitutes, then ˜ P(˜ x) is a
complete, non-empty lattice for all ˜ x ∈ ˜ X.
Proof. For any bundle ˜ x, there exists a price ˜ p such that ˜ x ∈ ˜ D(˜ p). Therefore, ˜ P(˜ x) is
nonempty. The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 14. 
5 Aggregate Demand and Equilibrium Analysis
The ﬁrst theorem of this section extends results by Gul and Stacchetti and by Milgrom
asserting necessary conditions for the existence of Walrasian equilibrium in the binary
formulation. These theorems assume that individual valuations are drawn from a set that
includes all unit-demand valuations (Gul and Stacchetti), which are deﬁned next, or all
additive valuations (Milgrom).11 They establish that if the set of valuations includes any
that are not strong substitutes, then there is a proﬁle of valuations to be drawn from the
set such that no competitive equilibrium exists.
11An additive valuation is a valuation with the property that the value of any set is equal to the sum
of the values of the singletons in the set.
17These results are unsatisfactory for our multi-unit context, because they allow preferences
to vary among identical items and the constructions used in those papers hinge on that
freedom. The next theorem extends the earlier results by including the restriction that
ﬁrms’ binary valuations are consistent with some multi-unit valuation, that is, that ﬁrms
treat all units of the same good symmetrically.




k Nk denote the total number of units in the economy.
Theorem 16 Consider a multi-unit endowment X and a ﬁrm having a concave, weak-
substitute valuation v1 on X that is not a strong-substitute valuation. Then there ex-
ist I ﬁrms, I ≤ N, with unit-demand valuations {vi}i∈I, such that the economy E =
(X,v1,...,vI+1) has no Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Since preferences are assumed to be quasi-linear, one can conveniently analyze equilib-
rium prices and allocations in terms of the solutions to certain optimization problems.
With that objective in mind, consider an economy consisting of n ﬁrms with valuations
{vi}1≤i≤n. The valuations vi are deﬁned for {x ∈ NK : xk ≤ Nk ∀k ∈ K}. It is convenient
to extend the domain of vi by setting v(x) = v(x∧(N1,...NK)) for all x in NK. We now









and the market dual proﬁt function of the economy by π(p) = maxx∈NK{v(x)−px}. The
function π is convex, as can be checked easily.















which concludes the proof. 
18Theorem 17 cannot be extended to nonlinear prices. To see this we observe, for example,
that the cheapest unit of a given good can only be allocated to a single ﬁrm when com-
puting the market dual proﬁt function, whereas it is included in all individual dual proﬁt
functions involving at least one unit of this good. It is thus easy to construct examples
where the market dual proﬁt function is strictly lower than the sum of individual dual
proﬁt functions, the latter allowing each ﬁrm to use the cheapest units.
Corollary 1 If all ﬁrms have weak-substitute valuations, then the market valuation v
is also a weak-substitute valuation.
Proof. If individual ﬁrms have substitute valuations, Theorem 2 implies that individual
proﬁt functions are submodular. By Theorem 17, the market dual proﬁt function is
therefore a sum of submodular functions, and so itself submodular. Theorem 2 then
allows us to conclude that v is a substitute valuation. 
Definition 11 A price vector p is a pseudo-equilibrium price of the economy with en-
dowment ¯ x if p ∈ argmin{π(p) + p¯ x}.
Section 6 uses the following characterization of pseudo-equilibrium prices.
Proposition 2 p is a pseudo-equilibrium price if and only if ¯ x is in the convex hull of
D(p).
Proof. By deﬁnition p minimizes the convex function f : p → π(p) + p¯ x. Therefore,
0 is in the subdiﬀerential of f at p.12 That is, 0 ∈ ∂π(p) + ¯ x. The extreme points of
−∂π(p) are bundles that are demanded at price p. Moreover, −D(p) ⊂ ∂π(p). Therefore
−Co(D(p)) = ∂π(p). Combining these results yields ¯ x ∈ Co(D(p)). 
Let P(¯ x) denote the set of pseudo-equilibrium prices.
Proposition 3 If all ﬁrms have weak-substitute valuations, then P(¯ x) is a complete
sublattice of P.
Proof. Individual weak-substitute valuations imply that πi is submodular for all i by
Theorem 2. Therefore, π is submodular. The proof is then identical to the proof of
Theorem 14. 
12See for example Rockafellar (1970).
19Theorem 18 The economy with endowment ¯ x has a Walrasian equilibrium if and only
if v(¯ x) = minp{π(p)+p¯ x}. Moreover, if the economy with endowment ¯ x has a Walrasian
equilibrium, then the set of Walrasian equilibrium prices is exactly the set P(¯ x) of pseudo-
equilibrium prices.
Proof. Theorem 1 implies that v(¯ x) ≤ minp{π(x)+p¯ x}. Suppose that v(¯ x) = π(p)+px for
some p. Let ¯ xi denote the bundle received by ﬁrm i for some ﬁxed allocation maximizing
the objective in the deﬁnition of v. For all i, vi(¯ xi) − p¯ xi ≤ πi(p). Summing these
inequalities yields v(¯ x) ≤ π(p) − p¯ x. By assumption, the last inequality holds as an
equality, which can only occur if vi(¯ xi) − p¯ xi = π(p) for all i, implying that (p, ¯ x1,..., ¯ xn)
is a Walrasian equilibrium. To prove the second claim, suppose that ({¯ xi}1≤i≤n,p) is a
Walrasian equilibrium. Then, vi(¯ xi) = πi(p) + p¯ xi for all i. Summing these equalities
yields v(¯ x) = π(p) + p¯ x, which implies that v(¯ x) = minp{π(p) + p¯ x} (since the minimum
is always above v(¯ x)). It is clear from the ﬁrst part of the proof that if the economy has a
Walrasian equilibrium, the set of Walrasian prices is exactly the set of pseudo-equilibrium
prices. 
Theorem 18 shows that whenever a Walrasian equilibrium exists, the concepts of pseudo-
equilibrium and equilibrium coincide. In binary economies, where nonlinear pricing is
available, the question of the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium have been solved by
Gul and Stacchetti (1999) and Milgrom (2000), who both show that equilibrium exists in
the binary formulation when goods are strong substitutes and establish the two partial
converses described above.
For the multi-unit formulation, we have already established the partial converse in Theo-
rem 16. We now consider the other direction: we prove that strong substitutes implies the
existence of a Walrasian equilibrium with linear pricing. This result is then used to prove
the stronger theorem that strong-substitute valuations are closed under aggregation: if
all valuations satisfy strong-substitutes, then so does the market valuation.
Theorem 19 (Linear-Pricing Walrasian Equilibrium) In a multi-unit exchange
economy with individual strong-substitute valuations, there exists a Walrasian equilibrium
with linear prices.
Proof. Considering the binary form of the economy, Gul and Stacchetti (1999, Corollary
1) have shown that the set of (nonlinear pricing) Walrasian equilibria is a complete lattice.
In particular, it has smallest and largest elements. We now prove that these two elements
20consist of linear prices, which proves the result. Suppose by contradiction that the largest
element ˜ p is such that ˜ pki 6= ˜ pkj for some units i, j of some good k. Then the price vector
˜ p0 equal to ˜ p except for units i and j of good k, where ˜ pki and ˜ pkj are swapped, is also
a Walrasian equilibrium. Therefore ˜ p ∨ ˜ p0 > ˜ p is also a Walrasian equilibrium, which
contradicts maximality of ˜ p. Linearity of the smallest element is proved similarly. 
Corollary 2 (Concavity of Aggregate Demand) In a multi-unit exchange econ-
omy with individual strong-substitute valuations, the market valuation is concave.
Proof. Denote by x the total endowment of the economy, and n the number of ﬁrms.
We show that for all y such that 0 ≤ y ≤ x, there exists a linear price vector p such
that y is in the demand set of the market valuation. From Theorem 19, we already know
that the result is true if y = x. Thus suppose that y < x. Consider an additional ﬁrm
with valuation vn+1(z) = Kz ∧ (x − y), where K is a large constant, greater than the
total value of other ﬁrms for the whole endowment x. One can easily check that vn+1
is an assignment valuation, and therefore a strong-substitute valuation (see Hatﬁeld and
Milgrom (2004)). Applying Theorem 19 to the economy with (n+1) ﬁrms, there exists a
Walrasian equilibrium with linear price vector p. At this price, the additional ﬁrm obtains
the bundle x−y since its marginal utility dominates all other ﬁrms’ for any unit up to this
bundle, and vanishes beyond this bundle. This implies that the remaining ﬁrms ask for y
at price p, or equivalently, that y belongs to the demand set of n ﬁrms’ market valuation
at price p. Concavity is then obtained as in the proof of Theorem 9. 
Theorem 20 (Aggregation) If individual ﬁrms have strong-substitutes valuations, then
the market valuation v is a strong-substitute valuation.
Proof. Let {vi}1≤i≤n denote the family of individual valuations and v denote the market




xi = x,xi ∈ N}. From Theorem 12, we
will prove the result if we show that v is a concave weak-substitute valuation that satisﬁes
the consecutive-integer property. Corollary 2 states that v is concave. From Corollary 1, v
is a weak-substitute valuation. It thus remains to show that v satisﬁes the consecutive-
integer property. For any price p, the demand set of v is the solution of
max






















i Di(p). In particular, the projection of D on the kth coordinate
satisﬁes Dk =
P
i Di,k. The sets Di,k consist of consecutive integers by Theorem 9,
21implying that Dk also consists of consecutive integers. 
Finally, we examine the connections between strong-substitute valuations and the struc-
ture of the core of the associated cooperative game. The setting considered in this section
is the same as Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), but with the multi-unit formulation replacing
their binary formulation. We ﬁrst recall the deﬁnitions of coalitional value functions, the
core, and Vickrey payoﬀs.
Suppose that, in addition to bidders, there exists a single owner (labeled “0”) of all units
of all goods, who has zero utility for her endowment.







if 0 ∈ S, and w(S) = 0 otherwise.
Denote L the set consisting of all bidders and the owner of the good.
Definition 13 The core of the economy is the set
Core(L,w) =
(






πl for all S ⊂ L
)
.
Definition 14 The Vickrey payoﬀ vector is given by ¯ πl = w(L)−w(L\l) for l ∈ L\0,
and ¯ π0 = w(L) −
P
l∈L\0 ¯ πl.
Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) show that this is the payoﬀ at the dominant-strategy solution
of the generalized Vickrey auction.
Definition 15 The coalitional value function w is bidder-submodular if for all l ∈ L\0
and sets S and S0 such that 0 ∈ S ⊂ S0, w(S) − w(S \ l) ≥ w(S0) − w(S0 \ l).
Theorem 21 Suppose that there are at least 2 + maxk Nk bidders. If any bidder has
a concave, weak-substitute valuation that is not a strong-substitute valuation, then there
exist linear or unit-demand valuations for remaining bidders such that the coalitional value
function is not bidder-submodular and the Vickrey payoﬀ vector is not in the core.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Theorem 22 If all bidders have strong-substitute valuations, then the coalitional value
function is bidder-submodular and the vector of Vickrey payoﬀs is in the core.
22Proof. From Ausubel and Milgrom (2002, Theorem 7), it is enough to show that the
coalitional value function is bidder-submodular. By assumption, the binary form ˜ vi of
each bidder satisﬁes the substitutes property. Therefore, applying Theorem 11 in Ausubel
and Milgrom (which is valid for the binary formulation) implies that the coalitional value
function is bidder-submodular (a property which is independent of the formulation (binary
or multi-unit). 
6 Walrasian Tˆ atonnement and Clock Auctions
This section analyzes auctions where goods are available in multiple units and prices are
linear. The goods are summarized by a vector ¯ x ∈ X = NK
++. We propose a class of
algorithms guaranteeing monotonic convergence of the auction to a pseudo-equilibrium
whenever bidders have weak-substitute valuations. Combining that with the the results
of Section 5 leads to the conclusion that if bidders have strong-substitute valuations, the
auctions converge to a Walrasian equilibrium.
For the present analysis, we deﬁne a clock auction as a price adjustment process in
which the path of prices is monotonic—either increasing or decreasing. In practice this
monotonicity and other features, especially activity rules for bidders (see Milgrom (2000)),
diﬀerentiate clock auctions from a Walrasian tˆ atonnement. In order to understand the
relation between substitute valuations and clock auctions, it is useful to start the analysis
with Walrasian tˆ atonnement and only later to impose monotonicity on the process.
6.1 Continuous time and price
We begin by analyzing an idealized economy with prices changing continuously through
time and where bidders submit their entire demand set. Later, we adapt the results to
economies with a discrete price and time, and where bidders only demand a single bundle
for each announced price vector.
There are n bidders with valuations {v1,...,vn} and a corresponding market valuation v.
At any time t, a price vector p(t) is posted. We limit attention to linear pricing. Each
bidder submits his demand set, resulting in an aggregate demand x(t) in the demand
set D(p(t)) of v.
23The goal of this section is to construct algorithms that are monotonic and converge to a
pseudo-equilibrium. We focus on algorithms for which initial price is low, then increases
and converges to the smallest pseudo-equilibrium price p
¯
. Reverse algorithms, where price
decreases and converges to the largest pseudo-equilibrium price can be constructed in a
similar way.
We have seen that pseudo-equilibrium prices are the minimizers of the convex function
f : p → π(p) + ¯ xp. Among the general algorithms to ﬁnd such minimizers are steepest-
descent algorithms. At any time, price changes are determined by the gradient of f
whenever f is diﬀerentiable, and by the vector of smallest norm of its subdiﬀerential
otherwise.13 Such algorithms are a particular Walrasian tˆ atonnement, as they adjust
prices to eliminate excess demand. Moreover, they follow the steepest descent and are
therefore particularly eﬃcient. For any price vector p, we denote by z(p) the point of
smallest norm in the opposite of the diﬀerential of f at p. When f is diﬀerentiable, z
corresponds to the excess (aggregate) demand D(p) − ¯ x. In general, z is the vector of
smallest norm in the convex hull of the set of excess demand. Intuitively, an algorithm is
a procedure that determines the evolution of price through time as a function of excess
demand D(p) − ¯ x and of time itself. In continuous time, an algorithm would then be
deﬁned by a function F such that ˙ p(t) = F(D − ¯ x,t). However, this deﬁnition is not
formally satisfactory in our setting, because F need not be continuous. The steepest-
descent algorithm, in particular, follows discontinuous changes of direction. In general,
we will say that an algorithm is well-deﬁned if, from any initial price, it generates a unique
trajectory in the price space. The previous considerations lead to the following deﬁnition.
Definition 16 A continuous, correspondence-based, steepest descent algorithm is deﬁned
by
˙ pr(t) = α(t,p(t))z(p(t)), (3)
where the subscript r denotes right derivative, the function α : (t,p) → α(t,p) is real-
valued and continuous, and takes values in [α
¯
, ¯ α] for some 0 < α
¯
< ¯ α.
Using right derivatives addresses discontinuities of z(p). The lower bound α
¯
ensures
that the algorithm does not stall at a suboptimal price, and the upper bound ensures
that that the equation is integrable. The following theorem states that, starting from any
13By deﬁnition, the subdiﬀerential ∂f(p) at p of a convex function f is the set of vectors x such that
f(q)−f(p) ≥ x(q −p) for all q. The subdiﬀerential is always a nonempty convex set, and coincides with
f’s gradient whenever it is diﬀerentiable.
24suﬃciently low price, the algorithm is well deﬁned, monotonic and converges to the lowest
pseudo-equilibrium price, p
¯
. Let L = {p : p ≤ p
¯
and z(p) ≥ 0}.
Theorem 23 Any continuous, correspondence-based, steepest-descent algorithm is well
deﬁned. Suppose that bidders have weak-substitutes valuations. For any such algorithm,
if p(0) ∈ L, then p(t) ∈ L for all t, p(t) is increasing and converges to p
¯
in ﬁnite time.
The proof is in the Appendix. Theorem 23 implies that, when bidders have weak-
substitute valuations, any steepest-descent algorithm starting from low prices is an as-
cending clock auction and converges to the smallest pseudo-equilibrium price. This result
is important in practice, and can be reformulated as follows. We deﬁne a continuous,
correspondence-based, ascending clock auction as a continuous, correspondence-based
steepest-descent algorithm, except that (3) is replaced by ˙ pr(t) = max{α(t,p(t))z(p(t)),0},
where the maximum is taken componentwise.
Corollary 3 If bidders have weak-substitute valuations, any continuous, correspondence-
based clock auction starting from a price in L converges to the smallest pseudo-equilibrium
price.
In particular, if goods are weak substitutes, ascending clock auctions will ﬁnd an equilib-
rium whenever there exists one. By contrast, it is easy to build examples of valuations
violating weak-substitutes such that a Walrasian equilibrium exists but ascending clock
auctions fail to ﬁnd it.
Our result extends Ausubel (2006) in three ways. First, it searches on the space of
linear prices, while Ausubel’s algorithm speciﬁes separate prices for each unit of the good.
Second and more importantly, it relies only on the assumption of weak substitutes, where
Ausubel’s analysis requires on the stronger assumption of strong substitutes. Third, it
shows the the process converges monotonically to pseudo-equilibrium prices, which always
exist in this setting and which are equilibrium prices whenever an equilibrium exists.
In theory, L depends on bidder valuations, which may see problematic, given that the
auctioneer does know them. In practice, the assumption p0 ∈ L means that the clock
auction can start at any price low enough to guarantee that there is excess demand in
all goods. This obviously includes zero initial prices, but also “reasonably low” reserve
prices.
256.2 Discrete time and price
We now consider the case in which prices evolve on a grid. In such setting, it is natural
to consider discrete-time models, as nothing happens in any interval of time during which
prices remain constant. We thus consider a discrete time scale, where prices are adjusted
at each period.14 The ﬁrst goal of this section is to show that the results derived in the
previous section are approximately true, in the sense that trajectories obtained with dis-
cretized algorithms are very close to those generated by continuous algorithms, provided
that the price grid is ﬁne enough. The second goal of the section is to show that the
algorithm still works if bidders only announce one desired bundle at each period, rather
than their entire demand set, consistent with what is observed in current practice.
A price grid is a lattice Pη = (ηN)K, where η is a small positive constant. A discrete
algorithm generates a sequence of prices {pt : t = 0,1,...} in Pη, whose evolution is
determined by excess demand at any period. In a discrete setting, algorithms are always
well-deﬁned. A new issue is that price changes, which are restricted to a grid, may not be
able to follow exactly the gradient z. In general, vector directions can be approximated
up to the ﬁneness of the grid, which is indexed by η. The following lemma goes further
by showing that, provided the grid is ﬁne enough, even the exact direction is feasible.
Following the previous section, we let z(p) denote the vector of smallest norm in the
convex hull of the excess (aggregate) demand set D(p)− ¯ x. The proof of the lemma is in
the Appendix.
Lemma 2 (Feasible directions of descent) Suppose that the number of bidders is
less than some constant N > 0, and that no bidder can demand more than overall supply
¯ x. Then, for any grid Pη, there exists α(η) > 0 such that α(η)z(p) ∈ Pη for all p and all
bidder valuations. Moreover, α can be chosen such that α(η) → 0 as η → 0.
In the rest of this section, we may therefore assume that the price grid is ﬁne enough for
price changes to exactly follow steepest-descent directions and be arbitrarily small. In
order to stay exactly on the grid, we assume from now on that step sizes are integer mul-
tiples of α(η). Another issue is that discrete algorithms sometimes “overshoot”, meaning
that the discrete price sequence crosses a region boundary while the continuous algorithm
follows the boundary, causing the discrete algorithm to enter regions where some goods
14The lapse between two periods has no importance, and in fact could in principle vary during the
auction, possibly stochastically.
26are in excess supply, and where the algorithm gradient z, which is not continuous, takes
very diﬀerent values from the gradient of the continuous algorithm. The purpose of the
following lemma is to show that such overshoots are not important, as nearby trajecto-
ries of any discrete steepest-descent algorithm stay close to each other. Let {p(t)}t∈N and
{q(t)}t∈N denote the trajectories generated by a given steepest-descent algorithm, starting
from respective initial prices p(0) and q(0).
Lemma 3 (Nearness Lemma) Suppose that the number of bidders is less than some
constant N > 0, that no bidder can demand more than aggregate supply ¯ x, and that there
exists a vector M ∈ RK
+ such that bidders demand none of good i whenever pi > Mi.
Then, for any ε > 0, there exists ¯ (η) > 0 and ¯ α > 0 such that for all η < ¯ (η) and step
sizes less than ¯ α, kp(0)−q(0)k < ε implies kp(t)−q(t)k < ε for all periods and all bidder
valuations.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The nearness lemma states that overshooting is not going to aﬀect the trajectory by
more than some arbitrarily small constant. This leads to the following theorem, which
states that the discrete algorithm essentially follows the continuous one. For any price
p0, denote by T(p0) = {p(t) : t ∈ R+,p(0) = p0} the trajectory generated by the con-
tinuous, correspondence-based steepest-descent algorithm of the previous section, and let
T(p0,ε) = ∪p∈T(p0)B(p,ε) denote the tube15 of radius ε around T(p0).
Theorem 24 (Discrete Steepest-Descent Algorithm) For any ε > 0, there ex-
ists η > 0 and ¯ α > 0 such that for any grid ﬁner than η, step size less than ¯ α, and initial
price p0, the trajectory generated by the discrete steepest descent algorithm is contained in
T(p0,ε).
Proof. Starting in the same region, trajectories of both algorithms are undistinguishable,
since they follow the same direction. Let t0 denote the ﬁrst time that the trajectory T
of the discrete algorithm overshoots, causing the two paths to have distinct vectors. Let
 > 0 be a positive constant (to be chosen later), and denote by pt0 the price of the discrete
algorithm, and by qt0 a price on T(p0) such that kpt0 − qt0k < . Such a price exists if
the step size ¯ α(), which gives an upper bound on the overshoot, is small enough. Let
T1 denote the trajectory that the discretized algorithm would generate if it were starting
from qt0. By construction T1 coincides with T(p0) until there is a second overshoot. By the
15B(p,ε) is the open ball centered at p and radius ε.
27nearness lemma, T and T1 are within ε from each other. Therefore, when T1 overshoots,
at time t1, there is a price qt1 of T(p0) such that kp(t1)−qt1k < 2. Iterating the process,
we thus prove that, up to the kth overshoot, we have T ⊂ T(p0,k) when T is truncated
at t = tk. The number of overshoots is bounded above by the number R of regions (since
any region is visited at most once by the continuous algorithm, see proof of Theorem 23).
Therefore, the result obtains by setting  = ε/R. 
As a by-product of Theorem 24, we can get rid at little cost of the assumption that bidders
submit their entire demand set. Bidder valuations can be seen as vectors of the ﬁnite-
dimensional space V = R¯ x. A property of an algorithm holds “for almost all economies”
if it holds for all bidder valuations, except for a subset of Lebesgue measure zero of Vn,
where n is the number of bidders. A singleton-based steepest-descent algorithm, is the
same as the discrete steepest-descent algorithm, except that bidders ask only one bundle
at each period. Concretely, this means that instead of using the vector of smallest norm
of the excess demand set, the algorithm may follow any vector of that set. The following
result shows that this information loss does not aﬀect Theorem 24 except possibly on a
set of economies with Lebesgue measure zero.
Theorem 25 (Singleton-Based Algorithm) Under the assumptions of Theorem 24,
let p0 be any initial price of the algorithm. The trajectory of a singleton-based steepest-
descent algorithm is contained in T(p0,ε) for almost all economies.
The proof is based on the following proposition.
Proposition 4 For all (v1,...,vn) ∈ Vn, the demand correspondence p → D(p) is
single-valued almost everywhere in P with respect to the Lebesgue measure on this set.
Proof. We suppose ﬁrst that there is a unique bidder. For any two bundles x and x0, the
subset P(x,x0) of P deﬁned by P(x,x0) = {p : p(x−x0) = v(x)−v(x0)}, is the intersection
of a hyperplane with the positive orthant P, and has therefore zero Lebesgue measure.






which contains all prices at which the bidder’s demand is multi-valued, also has zero
Lebesgue measure. For a countable (in particular, ﬁnite) number of bidders, the set of
prices where aggregate demand is multi-valued is contained in Qa = ∪Qi, which has zero
Lebesgue measure. 
28Proposition 4 implies that the set of economies such that Qa ∩Pη 6= ∅ has Lebesgue mea-
sure zero. Therefore, singleton-based and correspondence-based algorithms are identical
in almost all economies.
In practice, the auctioneer does not know bidder valuations. Theorem 25 implies that
for any belief that is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, the
algorithm is arbitrarily close to the continuous, correspondence-based steepest descent
algorithm of the ideal economy. In particular, the algorithm completely ignores bidders’
indiﬀerence sets. This feature contrasts with Gul and Stacchetti (2000), whose algorithm
gives much importance to indiﬀerence sets.
7 Conclusion
The substitutes concepts play a critical role in equilibrium theory. For discrete economies,
strong substitutes is necessary for the robust existence of equilibrium and weak substitutes
drive the monotonicity that is exploited by current auction algorithms. Strong substitutes
is also the condition that determines whether the Vickrey outcome is in the core. A
related concept–the law of aggregate demand–has been the informal justiﬁcation for the
wide adoption of activity rules in practical auctions. Among our ﬁndings is that the law
of aggregate demand is precisely the additional property that converts a concave weak
substitute valuation to a strong-substitute valuation when goods are discrete. Adapting
results from Hatﬁeld and Milgrom (2005), it is also possible to show that strong substitutes
is necessary for the existence of stable matchings in their contracting model. The analysis
also showed that the two concepts of substitutes are closed under aggregation.
Milgrom and Strulovici (2006) extend the analysis to divisible goods. In particular, for
divisible goods and concave valuations, a natural extension of strong substitutes coin-
cides with weak substitutes. In that case, the law of aggregate demand and its unit-free
extensions generally fail. Thus, for concave valuations, the law of aggregate demand
characterizes the diﬀerence between the cases of discrete goods and divisible goods.
298 Appendix: Proofs
8.1 Section 4
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider a bundle x such that xk ≤ Nk−1 and xj ≤ Nj −2. Take
any binary representant ˜ x of x, and call l and m two units of good j not in ˜ x, and s a
unit of good k not in ˜ x. Since ˜ v satisﬁes the gross-substitute property, the triple
{˜ v(˜ x + el + em) − ˜ v(x + el) − ˜ v(˜ x + em), ˜ v(˜ x + el + es) − ˜ v(˜ x + el) − ˜ v(˜ x + es),
˜ v(˜ x + em + es) − ˜ v(˜ x + em) − ˜ v(˜ x + es)} (4)
has at least two maximizers. Symmetry of ˜ v implies that the last two arguments of that
quantity are equal, and therefore greater than or equal to the ﬁrst one. That is, written
in multi-unit form v(x+ek +ej)−v(x+ek)−v(x+ej) ≥ v(x+2ej)−2v(x+ej) which
concludes the proof after simpliﬁcation. 
Proof of Theorem 10. Suppose by contradiction that the law of aggregate demand is
violated: there exist k, p and x such that for all ε small enough, we have (i) x ∈ D(p−εek),
and (ii) for all y ∈ D(p + εek), kyk1 > kxk1. Clearly, for any such y, we have yk < xk.
Let Dk = Dk(p), d
¯
= minDk and ¯ d = xk = maxDk. By continuity, we have (i) x ∈ D(p),




For each d ∈ Dk, deﬁne g(d) = min{ky−kk1 : yk = d and y ∈ D(p)}. Let γ : [d
¯
, ¯ d] → R
denote the largest convex function such that γ(d) ≤ g(d) for all d ∈ Dk. The function γ
is well deﬁned and piecewise aﬃne: there exists a partition ∆ = {δl}l∈Λ of [d
¯
, ¯ d] such that
γ is aﬃne on [δl,δl+1]. Moreover, ¯ d and d
¯
are elements of ∆: there exist l
¯





and ¯ d = δ¯ l. For l ∈ {l
¯
+ 1,¯ l}, denote H(l) the hyperplane containing the two
(K − 2)-dimensional aﬃne varieties
{z ∈ R
K : kz−kk1 = γ(δl) and zk = δl}
and
{z ∈ R
K : kz−kk1 = γ(δl−1) and zk = δl−1}.
There exists a unique hyperplane containing these two aﬃne varieties, so H(l) is well
deﬁned. Moreover, H(l) lies below D(p) and contains at least two elements z and y of
D(p) such that zk = δl and yk = δl−1.
30We claim that there exists l ∈ {l
¯
+1,¯ l} such that γ(δl−1)−γ(δl) > δl−δl−1. Suppose that
the contrary holds. Then, γ(d
¯




. But then, there exists y in D(p)
such that yk = d
¯
and ky−kk1 = γ(d
¯





which contradicts the hypothesized violation of the law of aggregate demand.
Consider an index l as in the previous paragraph, and modify p slightly so that the de-
mand set becomes D(p) ∩ H(l). The price vector can be further modiﬁed so that the
remaining bundles in the demand set are aligned on a unique straight line and, for the
new price ¯ p, there still exist z and y in D(¯ p) such that zk > yk and kzk1 < kyk1. There
are two cases: either there are two indices i and j such that yi > zi and yj > zj, or there
exists an index i such that yi − xi > xk − yk. Since optimal bundles are aligned, the
same properties hold for the extremities bundles of the segment containing D(¯ p), so we
assume without loss of generality that z and y are these extreme bundles. In the ﬁrst
case, increasing pi slightly violates the weak-substitute property, as the optimal quantity
of good j also decreases. In the second case, the convex-demand property is violated: the
set Di(¯ p) contains a hole between zi and yi. 
Proof of Proposition 1 Trivially,
max
x min
p {π(p) + px − (˜ p,x)} ≤ min
p max
x {π(p) + px − (˜ p,x)}. (5)
We need to prove that the reverse inequality also holds. We ﬁx ˜ p throughout the proof.
Consider a price p solving minp maxx{π(p)+px−(˜ p,x)}. Let N(p) = argmaxx{px−(˜ p,x)}.
N(p) is a hyper-rectangle: there exist two bundles r and R with r ≤ R such that N(p) =
{z ∈ ZK : r ≤ z ≤ R}.
Suppose that there exists a bundle x in N(p) ∩ D(p). Then, the right-hand side of (5)
equals π(p)+px−(˜ p,x) = v(x)−(˜ p,x), where the last equality comes from the fact that
x belongs to D(p). Now consider any linear price vector q. We have π(q) + qx − (˜ p,x) ≥
v(x) − (˜ p,x), by deﬁnition of π(q). This last inequality implies that the left-hand side
of (5) is actually greater than or equal to its right-hand side. Therefore, we will have
concluded the proof if we show that N(p) ∩ D(p) is nonempty, which we now turn to.
Let Co(D(p)) and Co(N(p)) denote the convex hulls of D(p) and N(p). We ﬁrst show
that Co(D(p)) ∩ Co(N(p)) has a nonempty intersection. Suppose by contradiction that
Co(D(p)) ∩ Co(N(p)) = ∅. Then, since these two sets are closed and convex, the
31separating-hyperplane theorem implies that there exists a direction δ and a number a
such that yδ < a for y ∈ N(p) and xδ > a for x ∈ D(p). Now modify p by an
inﬁnitesimal amount along the direction δ, yielding a new level q = p + εδ. The ob-
jective function π(p) + maxz{pz − (˜ p,z)} is aﬀected by this change in two ways. First,
through the sensitivity of π with respect to p. Taking any x ∈ D(q) ⊂ D(p), we have
π(p) = v(x) − px and π(q) = v(x) − qx. Therefore, the change of π is −εxδ. Second,
through the sensitivity of maxz{pz−(˜ p,z)} with respect to p. There exists y ∈ N(p) such
that maxz{pz−(˜ p,z)} = py−(˜ p,y) throughout the price change. Therefore, the eﬀect on
this term equals εyδ. The overall change of the objective function is then ε(y − x)δ < 0,
implying that q leads to a strictly lower objective function than p, which contradicts
optimality of p.
We have proved that the sets Co(D(p)) and Co(N(p)) have a non empty intersection. We
now prove that this intersection contains a point with integer coordinates. Consider any
polytope of RK. We say that an edge (i.e. a segment joining two vertices of the polytope)
is simply oriented if either (i) it is parallel to one coordinate axis {λei : λ ∈ R} of the
space or (ii) there exist two coordinates i and j such that the edge is parallel to ei−ej. We
say that a polytope is simply oriented if all its edges are simply oriented. Last, we recall
that a polytope all of whose vertices have integer coordinates is called a lattice polytope.
Lemma 4 If a lattice polytope P is simply oriented, and H is the half space {x : xk ≥ q},
where k ∈ {1,...,K} and q is an integer, then P ∩H is either the empty set, or a simply
oriented, lattice polytope.
Proof. Suppose that Q = P ∩ H is nonempty. Its vertices are either vertices of P, in
which case they are integral, or new vertices belonging to H. We prove that any such
vertex also has integer coordinates. Any new vertex x is the intersection of H with an
edge E of P that is not parallel to H. In particular, there exists an integral vertex y of
P such that x − y is parallel to E. Moreover, yk 6= q, since the edge is not parallel to H.
The edge is either parallel to ek or to ek − ei for some i 6= k. In the ﬁrst case, we have
xj = yj ∈ Z for all j 6= k and xk = q ∈ Z, so x has integer coordinates. In the second
case, xj = yj ∈ Z for all j / ∈ {i,k}, xk = q ∈ Z, and xi = yi + (yk − xk) ∈ Z, so x also
has integer coordinates. We now prove that the edges of Q are simply oriented. Thus
consider an edge E of Q, joining vertices x and y. If either x or y are vertices of P, then
E is either an edge of P, or the result of such an edge being cut by H. In either case, it is
simply oriented because P is simply oriented. If both x and y are new vertices, E is the
32intersection of a two-dimensional face F of P with H, where F is not parallel to H. F is
deﬁned by two linearly independent edges E0 and E00 of P which are simply oriented, and
at least one of which contains ek. Suppose ﬁrst that either E0 or E00, say E0, is orthogonal
to ek. Then it is easy to show that E is parallel to E00 and therefore simply oriented. Now
suppose that both E0 and E00 have a nonzero kth component. Because they are linearly
independent, there exist i and j such that F is generated by ek − ei and ek − ej (where
the signs come from the fact that P is simply oriented). In that case, as can be easily
veriﬁed, E is parallel to ei − ej, and therefore simply oriented. 
We observe that Lemma 4 still holds if the inequality sign is reversed in the deﬁnition of
H.
Co(D(p)) is a lattice polytope since D(p) consists of integral vectors. We now prove that
Co(D(p)) is simply oriented. Thus consider any edge E of Co(D(p)). There exists a
vector δ of RK such that E is included in some straight line ∆ = {x0 + λδ}λ∈R. We ﬁrst
show that δ has at most two nonzero components. Suppose on the contrary that δ has at
least three components, say i, j, and k. Without loss of generality assume that δi and δj
are positive. Since E is a face of Co(D(p)), there exists an inﬁnitesimal modiﬁcation of
the price vector p, such that D(p) = E. Moreover, E contains two vectors x and y such
that x − y = λδ for some λ > 0. If we slightly increase pi, x becomes suboptimal, so the
optimal quantity of good j decreases, which violates the weak-substitute property. Thus,
δ has at most two nonzero components. We now prove that E is simply oriented. If δ
has only one nonzero component, the claim is trivial. Suppose that δ has two positive
components, say i and j. We show that δi = −δj. Since E has integer vertices, we can
assume that δi and δj are integers.16 If δiδj > 0, slightly increasing pi reduces the optimal
quantity of good j which violates the weak-substitute property. Thus, δi and δj have
opposite signs. Now suppose that |δi| < |δj|. This implies that for all integral vectors x
and y in E, we have |xj −yj| ≥ 2, which violates the consecutive-integer property. Thus,
δi = −δj, which concludes the proof.
We have shown that Co(D(p)) is a simply oriented lattice polytope. Since Co(N(p)) is a
hyperrectangle of the form {x ∈ RK : a ≤ x ≤ b} for some integral vectors a and b, we
have, denoting H(k,q)+ = {x : xk ≥ q} and H(k,q)− = {x : xk ≤ q},




Iterating Lemma 4 2K times implies that Co(D(p)) ∩ Co(N(p)) is either the empty set
16See for example Korte and Vygen (2000).
33or a lattice polytope. Since we have already shown that this intersection is nonempty, it
must contain an integral point, which concludes the proof of Proposition 1. 
8.2 Section 5
Proof of Theorem 16. We extend part of the proof of Theorem 2 in Gul and Stacchetti
(1999) to a multi-unit context. By assumption, there exist a price vector ¯ p, a good k,
and bundles x and x0 such that (i) {x,x0} ∈ D(¯ p), (ii) x0
k − xk ≥ 2, and (iii) for all z
in D(¯ p), zk / ∈ (xk,x0
k). This implies that at the price p = ¯ p − ηek, x is only dominated
by bundles z such that zk ≥ xk + 2. In particular, the single-improvement property is
violated by x at price p. Therefore, any bundle y that solves minz
P
k |xk −zk| subject to
u1(z,p) > u1(x,p) satisﬁes yk ≥ xk + 2.
Let ρ =
P
j(yj−xj)+. By hypothesis, ρ ≥ 2. Let ε =
u1(y,p)−u1(x,p)
2ρ . Let I+ = {j : xj < yj},
I− = {j : xj > yj}, and I0 = {j : xj = yj}. If j ∈ I+, introduce Nj − yj ﬁrms, call them
“Cj”, with unit-demand valuation v1(X) + 2 for a single unit of good j. If j ∈ I+ \ {k},
introduce yj −xj ﬁrms, call them “cj”, with unit-demand valuation pj +ε for a single unit
of good j. If j = k, introduce yk −xk −1 ﬁrms (“ck”) with unit-demand valuation pk +ε
for a single unit of good k. If j ∈ I−, introduce Nj − xj ﬁrms (Cj) with unit-demand
valuation v1(X) + 1 for a single unit of good j, and xj − yj ﬁrms (cj) with unit-demand
valuation pj for a single unit of good j. If j ∈ I0, introduce Nj−xj ﬁrms with unit-demand
v1(X) + 1. Last, introduce a special ﬁrm, “ﬁrm 2”, with unit-demand pk + v1(X) + 1 for
a single unit of good k.
Now suppose that there exists a Walrasian equilibrium with price vector t, and let Xi
denote the bundle of the equilibrium received by ﬁrm i. Necessarily, (X1)j ≥ min{xj,yj}
for all j, since even if all unit-demand ﬁrms get one unit, there remain min{xj,yj} units
of good j. Deﬁne a new price vector as follows: qj = tj for j / ∈ I− and qj = pj for j ∈ I−.
For j ∈ I−, Nj − xj units go to ﬁrms Cj. The remaining xj units are shared between
ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrms cj, with at least yj units for ﬁrm 1. Now, if ﬁrm 1 has none of the
remaining xj − yj units, it means that tj ≤ pj, and this share remains optimal when tj is
increased to pj. If ﬁrm 1 has all of the remaining units, it means that tj ≥ pj, and this
share remains optimal when tj is decreased pj. If ﬁrm 1 has only a part of these remaining
units, it means that tj is already equal to pj. Thus (X,q) is also a Walrasian equilibrium,
34such that X1 ≥ x ∧ y. Moreover, all Cj get their units, so that X1 ≤ x ∨ y. Therefore
x ∧ y ≤ X1 ≤ x ∨ y. (6)
Firm 2 necessarily gets a unit of good k ∈ I+. Therefore, X1k < yk. This, together
with (6), implies that
P
k |xk − X1k| <
P
k |xk − yk|, and thus
u(X1,p) ≤ u(x,p). (7)
Suppose that there exist some goods j in I+ such that X1j > xj. This implies that
qj ≥ pj + ε, since ﬁrms cj would otherwise want to get all the units. Combining these
price inequalities with (7) yields u1(X1,q) < u1(x,q), which contradicts optimality of X1
for ﬁrm 1.
Suppose instead that X1j ≤ xj for all j. Then, all units between xj and yj for j ∈ I+ are
consumed by ﬁrms cj and by ﬁrm 2. For j 6= k, this implies that cj have a positive value
for the good: qj ≤ pj + ε. For j = k, even though ﬁrm 2 takes one units of the yk − xk
available units of k, the fact that yk ≥ xk + 2 implies that there is also a ﬁrm ck taking
one unit of good k, which implies that qk ≤ pk + ε. Since X1 = x on I+ and pj = qj
for j / ∈ I+, (7) implies u1(X1,q) ≤ u1(x,q). Since qj ≤ pj + ε for all j ∈ I+, the value
initially chosen for ε implies that u1(x,q) < u1(y,q), and thus u1(X1,q) < u1(y,q), which
contradicts optimality of the bundle X1 for ﬁrm 1. 
Proof of Theorem 21 From A&M Theorem 7 (which allows for multiple units of
goods), the vector of Vickrey payoﬀ vector is in the core if and only if the coalitional
value function is bidder-submodular. We show that under the assumptions of Theorem 21,
there always exist bidder valuations such that the coalitional value function is not bidder-
submodular. Suppose that bidder 1’s valuation violates the consecutive-integer property.
There exist ˆ p and k such that Dk(ˆ p) does not consist of consecutive integers. Let p =
ˆ p + εek for ε small enough. Then there exists x and z such that xk ≥ zk + 2, and
v(z) − pz > v(x) − px > v(y) − py (8)
for all y such that yk ∈ (zk,xk). Introduce a second bidder with linear valuation v2(x) =
p−kx−k, and xk − zk unit-demand bidders who only value good k. The total number of
bidders is xk − zk + 2 ≤ Nk + 2 ≤ maxk Nk + 2. From (8), we have
v(x) + p−k(¯ x − x)−k ≥ v(y) + p−k(¯ x − y)−k + pk(xk − yk)
35whenever xk − yk ≤ xk − zk − 1, and
v(z) + p−k(¯ x − z)−kpk(xk − zk) > v(x) + p−k(¯ x − x)−k.
Therefore, denoting S the set consisting of bidders 1, 2 and the xk − zk − 2 unit-demand
ﬁrms, and s and t the last two unit-demand bidders, we have w(S ∪ {s}) = w(S) and
w(S ∪ {s,t}) > w(S ∪ {t}), showing that w is not bidder-submodular. 
8.3 Section 6
Proof of Theorem 23. The proof is based on three lemmas, proving respectively
well-deﬁnedness, monotonicity, and conﬁnement in L.
Lemma 5 (Well-definedness) The continuous SDA algorithm is well deﬁned.
Proof. On any region of the price space where excess demand is constant, the algorithm
deﬁnes a straight trajectory of direction z, and is thus well-deﬁned.17 The only possible
problem, thus, is to rule out the possibility that there are inﬁnitely many region changes
in an arbitrarily small amount of time. With the steepest-descent algorithm, the norm of
z is nondecreasing in time. Since z is constant over any region where aggregate demand
is constant, and the norm of z strictly decreases each time it changes, any region that is
left is never visited again. 
Lemma 6 (Monotonicity) When bidders have weak-substitute valuations and z(0) ≥
0, p(·) is nondecreasing.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that z(t) fails to be nonnegative at some time t,
and take the smallest such time. Since z(0) ≥ 0, t > 0. By construction, z(s) ≥ 0
on a left neighborhood of t. Let m = z(t), x = z(t−), and P be the opposite of the
subdiﬀerential of f at p(t). P is a convex polytope, whose vertices are elements of the
excess demand at p(t), and m is the element of P with smallest norm. By assumption, x
is nonnegative. By continuity of demand, x must also belong to P. Let J = {k : mk < 0}.
By assumption, J 6= ∅. Let H be the aﬃne hyperplane going through (the point) m
and orthogonal to (the vector) m. By assumption, P is on one side of H and touches
H at m. Let F be the largest face of P contained in H, y be any vertex of F, and
17The scalar function α is immaterial, as long as it is bounded away from 0 and +∞.
36Cy = {z :
P
J mkzk ≥ kmk2 −
P
Jc msys}. Since y − m is orthogonal to m, Cy is a cone
with vertex y. We will show that Cy contains P but not x, a contradiction.




J mkyk = mJyJ, where the
components of mJ are equal to those of m on J and vanish on Jc, and a similar deﬁnition
for yJ. By convexity of F, m = y +
P
l αlEl, where {El} is the family of direction vectors
of the edges of F emanating from y. Taking the scalar product of the previous equality
with mJ yields mmJ = yJmJ +
P
l αlElmJ. We now prove that ElmJ = 0 for all l. By
construction of F,
m.El = 0. (9)
Moreover the weak substitute property implies that El has at most two nonzero com-
ponents, and any two nonzero components are of opposite sign (see the proof of Propo-
sition 1). If El has one nonzero component, it must be in Jc, otherwise it would vio-
late (9). If it has two nonzero components, then either they are both in J or both in
Jc, for otherwise (9) would be violated. In any case, this implies that El.mJ = 0. Thus,
mJvJ = m2
J > 0. In particular Cy = {z :
P
J mkzk ≥ m2
J}. Since the components of x
are nonnegative by construction, x cannot belong to Cy.
To conclude the proof, we show that Cy contains P. By convexity of P, it is enough to
show that all edges of P emanating from y are going in the cone Cy. This will be the case
if we show that for any such edge with direction δ (away from y), we have
δmJ ≥ 0. (10)
By deﬁnition of F, we have δm ≥ 0 (i.e. any edge from y must point outwards from H).
Since bidders have weak-substitute valuations, δ has at most two nonzero components.
Suppose ﬁrst that it has exactly two components, δi and δj. If i,j are in J, then (10)
trivially holds. If i,j are in Jc, then (10) is an equality. If i ∈ J and j ∈ Jc, then δm ≥ 0
and the fact that δiδj < 0 (by weak-substitutes) implies that δi < 0, and thus that (10)
holds. If there is only one nonzero component, (10) holds trivially. 
Lemma 7 (Confinement) If bidders have weak-substitute valuations, p(0) ≤ p
¯
and
z(0) ≥ 0, then p(t) ≤ p
¯
for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. Suppose not: there exists a time t such that p(t) crosses the hyperrectangle
R = {z : z ≤ p
¯
} from inside out. In particular, the index subset I = {j : pj(t) = p
¯
j}
is nonempty, and we have pj(t) < p
¯
j for j / ∈ I. Moreover, p(s)  p
¯
for s in a right
neighborhood of t: there exists a nonempty subset J ⊂ I such that ps,j > p
¯
j for j ∈ J
37and s ∈ (t,t + ε). By construction of the algorithm, this means that the vector n of
smallest norm in the opposite of the subdiﬀerential of p(t) satisﬁes nj > 0 for j ∈ J.
We will contradict this statement by showing that the vector m deﬁned by mj = nj for
j / ∈ J and mj = 0 for j ∈ J is in the opposite of the subdiﬀerential. m’s norm is strictly
smaller than n’s, contradicting the assumption that n is of smallest norm in the opposite
of the subdiﬀerential. By deﬁnition of the subdiﬀerential, we need to show that, letting
p = p(t),
m(q − p) ≥ f(p) − f(q) (11)
for all q. We ﬁrst show this inequality in a neighborhood of p. By construction of n,
n(q − p) ≥ f(p) − f(q) for all q. Therefore, (11) is automatically satisﬁed for q such that
qj ≤ pj for j ∈ J. Now consider the case where qj > pj for a subset J(q) of J. Consider
the vector q0 such that q0
j = qj for j / ∈ J(q) and q0
j = pj for j ∈ J(q). Since we are in
a neighborhood of p, qj ≤ p
¯
j for all j / ∈ J(q). This implies that q0 ≤ p
¯
and, therefore,
that q0 = q ∧ p
¯
. Submodularity of f implies f(p
¯
∧ q) + f(p
¯
∨ q) ≤ f(p
¯
) + f(q). The
inequality, combined with the fact that p
¯
is a minimum of f, implies that f(q0) ≤ f(q).
By construction of q0,
m(q − p) = m(q
0 − p) ≥ n(q
0 − p) ≥ f(p) − f(q
0) ≥ f(p) − f(q),
which concludes the proof on a neighborhood of p. To prove the result globally, consider
any vector q and let qλ = λq + (1 − λ)p where λ ∈ (0,1). From the previous analysis,
we have for λ small enough m(qλ − p) ≥ f(p) − f(qλ). By convexity of f, f(qλ) ≤
λf(q) + (1 − λ)f(p). Combining the previous two inequalities and dividing by λ yields
the result. 
We now conclude the proof of the theorem. Since p(t) is nondecreasing and bounded, it
must converge to some limit in L. Since α is bounded away from zero, the rate of change
of p is bounded away from zero on any closed subset of the price space that does not
contain any pseudo-equilibrium price. Since the only pseudo-equilibrium price contained
in L is p
¯
, this has to be the limit.
Proof of Lemma 2. By assumption, the excess demand set is an integer polytope of
RK, bounded by the rectangle [−¯ x,N¯ x]. Therefore, z can only take ﬁnitely many values.
Since any such z is the vector of minimum norm of an integral polytope, it has rational
coordinates. Therefore, its direction can always be achieved on any regular lattice. That
is, there exists a positive number α(z) such that α(z)z is the diﬀerence vector of two
points of the lattice. Moreover, the smallest such α(z) gets arbitrarily small as the grid
38gets arbitrarily thin. Since there are ﬁnitely many values of z, maxz{α(z)} goes to zero
as the grid thinness η goes to zero. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to price
vectors less than M. Since the number of bidders is ﬁnite, the function f : p → π(p)+ ¯ xp
is piecewise aﬃne, with ﬁnitely many regions. Moreover, directions of the hyperplanes
supporting f are determined by excess demand vectors, which take ﬁnitely many values
(cf. proof of Lemma 2). Since z is in the opposite of the diﬀerential of f, f(q) − f(p) ≥
z(p)(p − q) for all q, with strict inequality if p and q are in distinct regions. The fact
that p is bounded by M and that there are ﬁnitely many possible slopes for f implies the
existence of a constant ρ > 0 such that
f(q) − f(p) ≥ ρ + z(p)(p − q) (12)
whenever p and q are not in the same region. We now consider paths of the discrete
steepest-descent algorithm starting from respective initial price vectors p0 and q0, with
kp0 − q0k < ε. Trajectories are parallel until the two prices reach diﬀerent regions, and
thus leave the vector pt − qt unchange until that time. Let s ≥ 0 denote the ﬁrst time
that the two paths hit distinct regions. (12) implies f(qs)−f(ps) ≥ ρ+z(ps)(ps−qs) and
f(ps)−f(qs) ≥ ρ+z(qs)(qs)−ps). Summing these inequalities yields18 (z(ps)−z(qs))(ps−
qs) ≤ −2ρ. Let α be the step size19 of the steepest-descent algorithm: ps+1 = ps+αz(ps),
and qs+1 = qs + αz(qs)
kps+1 − qs+1k
2 = kps − qsk
2 + kα(z(ps) − z(qs))k
2 + 2α(z(ps) − z(qs)) · (ps − qs).
Therefore,
kps+1 − qs+1k
2 − kps − qsk
2 ≤ −4ρα + O(α
2),
which is negative for α small enough, which we impose by appropriately setting ¯ α. Thus,
we have proved that kpt − qtk remains constant when prices are in the same region, and
decreases otherwise. 
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